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Abstract
An extended visual cryptography scheme (EVCS), for an access structure ( Qual;  Forb) on
a set of n participants, is a technique to encode n images in such a way that when we stack
together the transparencies associated to participants in any set X 2 Qual we get the secret
message with no trace of the original images, but any X 2 Forb has no information on the
shared image. Moreover, after the original images are encoded they are still meaningful, that is,
any user will recognize the image on his transparency.
The main contributions of this paper are the following:
 A trade-o between the contrast of the reconstructed image and the contrast of the image on
each transparency for (k; k)-threshold EVCS (in a (k; k)-threshold EVCS the image is visible
if and only if k transparencies are stacked together). This yields a necessary and sucient
condition for the existence of (k; k)-threshold EVCS for the values of such contrasts. In case
a scheme exists we explicitly construct it.
 A general technique to implement EVCS, which uses hypergraph colourings. This technique
yields (k; k)-threshold EVCS which are optimal with respect to the pixel expansion. Finally, we
discuss some applications of this technique to various interesting classes of access structures
by using relevant results from the theory of hypergraph colourings. c© 2001 Elsevier Science
B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
A visual cryptography scheme for a set P of n participants is a method to en-
code a secret image SI into n shadow images called shares, where each participant in
P receives one share. Certain qualied subsets of participants can \visually" recover
the secret image, but other, forbidden, sets of participants have no information (in an
information-theoretic sense) on SI . A \visual" recovery for a set X P consists of xe-
roxing the shares given to the participants in X onto transparencies, and then stacking
them. The participants in a qualied set X will be able to see the secret image without
any knowledge of cryptography and without performing any cryptographic computa-
tion. The schemes we consider are unconditionally secure in that any forbidden set of
participants does not gain information about the shared image, even though it has ac-
cess to an innite computational power. Visual cryptography schemes are characterized
by two parameters: The pixel expansion, which is the number of sub-pixels each pixel
of the original image is encoded into on each transparency, and the contrast which
measures the \dierence" between a black and a white pixel in the reconstructed image.
This cryptographic paradigm was introduced by Naor and Shamir [13]. They analysed
the case of a (k; n)-threshold visual cryptography schemes, in which the secret image
is visible if and only if any k transparencies are stacked together. Further results on
(k; n)-threshold visual cryptography schemes can be found in [1{6, 9, 11, 16].
The model by Naor and Shamir has been extended in [1, 2] to general access struc-
tures (an access structure is a specication of all qualied and forbidden subsets of
participants) and general techniques to construct visual cryptography schemes for any
access structure have been proposed. In [6] the authors propose k out of n visual
cryptography schemes achieving a greater relative dierence than previously known
schemes. In the case of 2 out of n visual cryptography schemes the scheme given in
[6] achieves the best possible value for the relative dierence. In [9] a new technique is
presented to construct k out of n visual cryptography schemes. Finally, in [11], using a
linear programming technique, the authors gave constructions for (k; n)-threshold visual
cryptography schemes having large relative dierence, for k 2f3; 4; ng. Also, for k =2,
they have independently derived some results similar to the ones in [6] for certain
values of n.
In implementing visual cryptography schemes it would be useful to conceal the ex-
istence of the secret message, namely, the shares given to participants in the scheme
should not look as a random bunch of pixels, but they should be images (an house,
a dog, a tree, etc.). As an example, let P= f1; 2; 3g and consider the access struc-
ture  Qual= ff1; 2g; f2; 3g; f1; 2; 3gg (we stipulate that all remaining subsets of P are
forbidden). We would like to share the picture S in such a way that the share of par-
ticipant 1 is the picture A the share of participant 2 is the picture B , and the share
of participant 3 is the picture C . This shares distribution should have the property that
when participants 1 and 2, or participants 2 and 3, or participants 1, 2, and 3 stack
together their transparencies they get the secret image S (the shares generated by an
extended visual cryptography scheme for  Qual are given in Appendix A).
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An extended visual cryptography scheme for an access structure ( Qual;  Forb) on
a set of n participants, is a technique to encode n images in such a way that when
we stack together the transparencies associated to participants in any set X 2 Qual we
get the secret message with no trace of the original images, but any X 2 Forb has no
information on the shared image. Moreover, after the original images are encoded they
are still meaningful, that is, any user will recognize the image on his transparency.
Naor and Shamir [13] rst considered the problem of concealing the existence of
the secret message for the case of 2 out of 2 threshold VCS. Droste [9] considered
the problem of sharing more than one secret image among a set of participants. For
example, in the appendix of [9], a 2 out of 3 threshold visual cryptography scheme
is presented in which each pair of transparencies reveals a dierent secret image. A
construction is given to obtain visual cryptography schemes in which dierent subsets of
transparencies reveal dierent secret images. This construction also provides a method
of obtaining EVCS; however, it is not as ecient as the method presented in this
paper.
Visual cryptography schemes have been also considered in [12, 14{16]. In [14] an al-
ternative reconstruction method for visual cryptography schemes is studied. This method
yields a higher contrast in the reconstructed image for 2 out of n threshold schemes,
but the technique is not applicable to k out of n threshold schemes with k>3. Visual
cryptography schemes to encrypt coloured images are given in [12, 15, 16].
In this paper we study extended visual cryptography schemes, EVCS for short, for
any access structure ( Qual;  Forb). The parameter m denotes the pixel expansion of
the scheme, and the quantities F and S measure the contrast of the reconstructed
image and the contrast of the shares, respectively. We provide a trade-o between the
contrast of the reconstructed image (i.e., F(m)  m) and the contrast of the image
on each transparency (i.e, F(m)  m) for (k; k)-threshold EVCS. In a (k; k)-threshold
EVCS the original image is visible if and only if k transparencies are stacked together.
(The contrasts are measured by the relative dierences of the scheme, dened in
Section 3.) This yields a necessary and sucient condition for the existence of (k; k)-
threshold EVCS for the values of such contrasts. We characterize the admissible region
for the relative dierences F(m) and S(m) and for any pair of values in this region we
show how to construct a (k; k)-threshold EVCS achieving both relative dierences. We
give a general technique to implement extended visual cryptography schemes, which
uses hypergraph colourings. This technique yields (k; k)-threshold EVCS which are op-
timal with respect to the pixel expansion. Finally, we discuss some applications of this
technique to various interesting classes of access structures by using relevant results
from the theory of hypergraph colourings.
2. Visual cryptography schemes
Let P= f1; : : : ; ng be a set of elements called participants, and let 2P denote the
set of all subsets of P. Let  Qual 2P and  Forb 2P, where  Qual \ Forb= ;. We
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refer to members of  Qual as qualied sets and we call members of  Forb forbidden
sets. The pair ( Qual;  Forb) is called the access structure of the scheme.
Dene  0 to consist of all the minimal qualied sets:
 0 = fA2 Qual: A0 =2 Qual for all A0A; A0 6= Ag:
A participant P 2P is an essential participant if there exists a set X P such that
X [fPg2 Qual but X =2 Qual. If a participant P is not essential then we can construct a
visual cryptography scheme giving him nothing as his=her share. In fact, a non-essential
participant does not need to participate \actively" in the reconstruction of the image,
since the information he=she has is not needed by any set in P in order to recover the
shared image. In any VCS having non-essential participants, these participants do not
require any information in their shares. Therefore, we assume throughout this paper
that all participants are essential.
In the case where  Qual is monotone increasing,  Forb is monotone decreasing, and
 Qual [ Forb=2P, the access structure is said to be strong, and  0 is termed a basis.
(This situation is the usual setting for traditional secret sharing.) In a strong access
structure,
 Qual= fC P: BC for some B2 0g
and we say that  Qual is the closure of  0 (denoted by cl( 0)).
For sets X and Y and for elements x and y, to avoid overburdening the notation,
we often will write x for fxg, xy for fx; yg, xY for fxg[Y , and XY for X [Y .
We assume that the message consists of a collection of black and white pixels. Each
pixel appears in n versions called shares, one for each transparency. Each share is a
collection of m black and white sub-pixels. The resulting structure can be described
by an n  m Boolean matrix S = [sij] where sij =1 i the jth sub-pixel in the ith
transparency is black. Therefore, the grey level of the combined share, obtained by
stacking the transparencies i1; : : : ; is, is proportional to the Hamming weight wH (V ) of
the m-vector V =OR(ri1 ; : : : ; ris) where ri1 ; : : : ; ris are the rows of S associated with the
transparencies we stack. This grey level is interpreted by the visual system of the users
as black or as white in according with some rule of contrast. We recall the formal
denition of VCS proposed in [1], which is an extension of [13].
Denition 2.1. Let ( Qual;  Forb) be an access structure on a set of n participants.
Two collections (multisets) of n  m boolean matrices C0 and C1 constitute a visual
cryptography scheme (( Qual;  Forb; m)-VCS) if there exist the value (m) and the set
f(X; tX )gX2 Qual satisfying:
1. Any (qualied) set X = fi1; i2; : : : ; ipg2 Qual can recover the shared image by
stacking their transparencies.
Formally, for any M 2C0, the \or" V of rows i1; i2; : : : ; ip satises wH (V )6tX −
(m)  m; whereas, for any M 2C1 it results that wH (V )>tX .
2. Any ( forbidden) set X = fi1; i2; : : : ; ipg2 Forb has no information on the shared
image.
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Formally, the two collections of p  m matrices Dt , with t 2f0; 1g, obtained by
restricting each n m matrix in Ct to rows i1; i2; : : : ; ip are indistinguishable in the
sense that they contain the same matrices with the same frequencies.
Each pixel of the original image will be encoded into n pixels, each of which consists
of m sub-pixels. To share a white (black, resp.) pixel, the dealer randomly chooses
one of the matrices in C0 (C1, resp.), and distributes row i to participant i. The chosen
matrix denes the m sub-pixels in each of the n transparencies. Observe that the size
of the collections C0 and C1 does not need to be the same.
The rst property is related to the contrast of the image. It states that when a
qualied set of users stack their transparencies they can correctly recover the image
shared by the dealer. The value (m) is called relative dierence, the number (m) m
is referred to as the contrast of the image, the set f(X; tX )gX2 Qual is called the set
of thresholds, and tX is the threshold associated to X 2 Qual. We want the contrast to
be as large as possible and at least one, that is, (m)>1=m. The second property is
called security, since it implies that, even by inspecting all their shares, a forbidden
set of participants cannot gain any information in deciding whether the shared pixel
was white or black.
Notice that if a set of participants X is a superset of a qualied set X 0, then they can
recover the shared image by considering only the shares of the set X 0. This does not
in itself rule out the possibility that stacking all the transparencies of the participants
in X does not reveal any information about the shared image.
Let M be a matrix in the collection C0 [C1 of a ( Qual;  Forb; m)-VCS on a set of
participants P. For X P, let MX denote the m-vector obtained by considering the or
of the vectors corresponding to participants in X ; whereas M [X ] denotes the jX jm
matrix obtained from M by considering only the rows corresponding to participants
in X .
We make a couple of observations about the structure of  Qual and  Forb in light of
the above denition. First, it is clear that any subset of a forbidden subset is forbidden,
so  Forb is necessarily monotone decreasing. Second, it is also easy to see that no
superset of a qualied subset is forbidden. Hence, a strong access structure is simply
one in which  Qual is monotone increasing and  Qual [ Forb=2P.
Notice also that, given an (admissible) access structure ( Qual;  Forb), we can \em-
bed" it in a strong access structure ( 0Qual;  
0
Forb) in which  Qual 0Qual and  Forb
 0Forb. One way to do this is to take ( 
0
Qual;  
0
Forb) to be the strong access struc-
ture having as basis  0, where  0 consists of the minimal sets in  Qual, as usual.
In view of the above observations, it suces to construct VCS for strong access
structures.
2.1. Basis matrices
The constructions in this paper are realized using two n  m matrices, S 0 and S1
called basis matrices satisfying the following denition.
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Denition 2.2. Let ( Qual;  Forb) be an access structure on a set of n participants.
A visual cryptography scheme ( Qual;  Forb; m)-VCS with relative dierence (m) and
set of thresholds f(X; tX )gX2 Qual is realized using the nm basis matrices S 0 and S1
if the following two conditions hold:
1. If X = fi1; i2; : : : ; ipg2 Qual (i.e., if X it is a qualied set), then the \or" V of rows
i1; i2; : : : ; ip of S 0 satises wH (V )6tX − (m)  m; whereas, for S1 it results that
wH (V )>tX .
2. If X = fi1; i2; : : : ; ipg2 Forb (i.e., if X is a forbidden set), then the two pm matri-
ces obtained by restricting S 0 and S1 to rows i1; i2; : : : ; ip are equal up to a column
permutation.
The collections C0 and C1 are obtained by permuting the columns of the corre-
sponding basis matrix (S 0 for C0 and S1 for C1) in all possible ways. Note that, in
this case, the size of the collections C0 and C1 is the same and it is denoted by r.
This technique has been introduced in [13]. The algorithm for the VCS based on the
previous construction of the collections C0 and C1 has small memory requirements (it
keeps only the basis matrices S 0 and S1) and it is ecient (to choose a matrix in C0
(C1, resp.) it only generates a permutation of the columns of S 0 (S1, resp.)).
3. Extended visual cryptography schemes
To realize a VCS for an access structure   on a set of n participants we want to
encode a secret image into n shares in such a way that the properties of Denition 2.1
are satised. In the case of EVCSs the n shares have to be images. Therefore, we
start with n+ 1 images (the rst n are associated with the n participants whereas the
last one is the secret image) to obtain n shares that have to be still meaningful, that
is, any user is able to see the image in his transparency we started with. Hence, any
technique to implement EVCSs has to take into consideration the colour of the pixel
in the secret image we want to obtain. In the following, we will refer to the colour of
a white (black) pixel as a w pixel (b pixel). In general, we denote with Cc1cnc , where
c; c1; : : : ; cn 2fb; wg, the collection of matrices from which the dealer chooses a matrix
to encode, for i=1; : : : ; n, a ci pixel in the image associated to participants i in order
to obtain a c pixel when the transparencies associated to a set X 2 Qual are stacked
together. Hence, to realize an EVCS we have to construct 2n pairs of such collections
(Cc1cnw ;C
c1cn
b ), one for each possible combination of white and black pixels in the n
original images.
A participant P is isolated if fPg2 Qual, that is, if he can reconstruct the secret
by himself, without the concurrence of other participants. In this paper we assume
that there is no isolated participant in the access structure. This assumption is not so
strong as it could seem, since it does not make sense to consider isolated partici-
pants in EVCS. If we allow access structure to contain isolated participants in EVCS,
then this would mean that from a meaningful picture (the one held by the isolated
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participant) we are able to get the secret image just looking at it, without performing
any cryptographic computation. Clearly, this is impossible, unless the picture held by
the isolated participant is the secret itself. Hence, through this paper we assume that
the access structures do not contain isolated participant.
An EVCS for an access structure ( Qual;  Forb) is dened as follows.
Denition 3.1. Let ( Qual;  Forb) be an access structure on a set of n participants.
A family of 2n pairs of collections (multisets) of n  m boolean matrices f(Cc1cnw ;
Cc1cnb )gc1 ;:::;cn 2fb;wg constitutes a ( Qual;  Forb; m)-EVCS if there exist values F(m),
S(m), and f(X; tX )gX2 Qual satisfying:
1. Any (qualied) set X 2 Qual can recover the shared image.
Formally, for any X 2 Qual and for any c1; : : : ; cn 2fb; wg the threshold tX and the
relative dierence F(m) are such that for any M 2C c1cnw we have that wH (MX )6
tX − F(m) m; whereas, for any M 2Cc1cnb it results that wH (MX )>tX .
2. Any ( forbidden) set X = fi1; : : : ; ipg2 Forb has no information on the shared
image.
Formally, for any X 2 Forb and for any c1; : : : ; cn 2fb; wg, the two collections of
p  m matrices Dc1 ; :::; cnt with t= fb; wg, obtained by restricting each n  m matrix
in Cc1 ; :::; cnt to rows i1; : : : ip, are indistinguishable in the sense that they contain the
same matrices with the same frequencies.
3. After the original images are encoded they are still meaningful, that is, any user
will recognize the image on his transparency.
Formally, for any i2f1; : : : ; ng and any c1; : : : ; ci−1; ci+1; : : : ; cn 2fb; wg it results
that
min
M2Mb
wH (Mi)− max
M2Mw
wH (Mi)>S(m)  m;
where Mb=
S
c1 ; :::; ci−1 ; ci+1 ;:::; cn 2fb;wgC
c1ci−1bci+1 cn
w
and Mw =
S
c1 ; :::; ci−1 ; ci+1 ; :::; cn 2fb;wgC
c1ci−1wci+1 cn
w .
The values F(m) and S(m) are referred to as relative dierence of the nal image
and relative dierence of the shares, respectively. We assume F(m) and S(m) take
values on the rational numbers. As we want the contrast to be as large as possible, we
have that F(m)  m>1 and S(m)  m>1.
The rst condition states that a qualied set of users, belonging to  Qual, stacking
their transparencies can correctly recover the secret image. The second condition is
related to the security of the scheme, it implies that by inspecting the shares associated
to a non-qualied subset of participants one cannot gain any information on the shared
image even though he knows the original images of all n participants we started with.
Clearly, conditions 1 and 2 are equivalent to state that for any c1; : : : ; cn 2fb; wg, the
pair of collections (Cc1cnw ;C
c1cn
b ) constitutes a visual cryptography scheme. Finally,
the third condition implies that the original images are not \modied", that is, after we
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encode the n original images by using the 2n pairs of collections (Cc1cnw ;C
c1cn
b ), where
c1; : : : ; cn 2fb; wg, any user will recognize the image on his transparency. Notice that
dening the quantities Mw and Mb we do not include the collections C
c1ci−1bci+1 cn
b
and C
c1ci−1wci+1 cn
b as, by the second condition, for any c1; : : : ; cn 2fb; wg and any
i2f1; : : : ; ng, we have that fM [i] : M 2Cc1cnw g= fM [i] : M 2Cc1cnb g.
It is worthwhile to note that for any X 2 Qual and for any c1; : : : ; cn 2fb; wg the
threshold tX and the relative dierence (m) satisfy tX6t
c1cn
X and t
c1cn
X − c1cn(m) 
m6tX −(m) m, where t c1cnX is the threshold associated to set X and c1cn(m) is the
relative dierence of the ( Qual;  Forb; m)-VCS represented by the pair of collections
(Cc1cnw ;C
c1cn
b ).
The dealer on input n+ 1 images, that is, the images for the n participants and the
secret image, generates n shares to be distributed to the participants.
We considered EVCS in which the 2n pairs of collections f(Cc1cnw ;Cc1cnb )g, where
c1; : : : ; cn 2fb; wg, have the same parameter m. This is not a restriction at all, but
we considered EVCS having the same parameter m only to avoid overburdening the
notation. From an arbitrary EVCS we can easily obtain an EVCS having the same
parameter m for all the collections

(Cc1cnw ;C
c1cn
b )
}
.
The next example shows how to realize a 2 out of 2 threshold EVCS. This scheme
is realized using the general construction presented in Section 5. The resulting family
of pairs of collections of matrices are the same as that proposed in [13].
Example 3.2. The collections Cc1c2c , where c; c1; c2 2fb; wg, of a 2 out of 2 threshold
EVCS are obtained by permuting the columns of the following matrices:
Swww =

1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0

and Swwb =

1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0

;
Swbw =

1 0 0 1
1 0 1 1

and Swbb =

1 0 0 1
0 1 1 1

;
Sbww =

1 0 1 1
1 0 1 0

and Sbwb =

1 0 1 1
0 1 1 0

;
Sbbw =

1 0 1 1
1 0 1 1

and Sbbb =

1 0 1 1
0 1 1 1

:
In such a scheme we have that F = S = 14 .
4. Optimal contrast (k; k)-threshold EVCS
In this section we prove an upper bound on the relative dierences F(m) and S(m)
of any (k; k)-threshold EVCS. We characterize the admissible region for the relative
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dierences F(m) and S(m) and for any pair of values in this region we show how
to construct a (k; k)-threshold EVCS with those relative dierences.
The following lemma has been proved in [1]; we repeat its proof here for the reader’s
convenience. We will use it in our constructions for extended visual cryptography
schemes. With  we denote the operator \concatenation" of two matrices.
Lemma 4.1. Let ( Qual;  Forb) be an access structure on a set P of n participants. Let
C0 and C1 be the matrices in a ( Qual;  Forb; m)-VCS and let D be any nh boolean
matrix. The collections of matrices C00 = fM D: M 2C0g and C01 = fM D: M 2C1g
comprise a ( Qual;  Forb; m+ h)-VCS.
Proof. Since we concatenate the same matrix D to any M 2C0 [C1, then Properties 1.
and 2. of Denition 2.1 are satised. Moreover, the frequencies of matrices associated
with forbidden sets and the set of thresholds f(X; tX )gX2 Qual do not change in going
from C0 and C1 to C00 and C
0
1. Only the relative dierence 
0(m0) changes, becoming
0(m0)= ((m)  m)=(m+ h).
The next theorem holds.
Theorem 4.2. In any (k; k)-threshold EVCS with pixel expansion m the relative dif-
ferences F(m) and S(m) satisfy
2k−1F(m) +
k
k − 1S(m)61:
Proof. Let f(Cc1ckw ;Cc1ckb )gc1 ; :::; ck 2fb;wg be a family of 2n pairs of collections con-
stituting a (k; k)-threshold EVCS. Since we are interested in limiting the relative dier-
ences F(m) and S(m), without loss of generality, we assume that, for any choices of
c1; : : : ; cn 2fb; wg, the pair of collections (Cc1cnw ;Cc1cnb ) are obtained by permuting,
in all possible ways, the columns of the pair of basis matrices (Sc1cnw ; S
c1cn
b ) (see
Section 6 of [6]). Let (S0; S1) be a pair of basis matrices of a (k; k)-threshold VCS
with pixel expansion m and relative dierence (m). According to Theorem 7.2 in
[6] there exist a boolean matrix D and an integer h>(m)  m such that D is a sub-
matrix of both S 0 and S1, all the even columns appear in S0nD with multiplicity h,
and all the odd columns appear in S1nD with multiplicity h. Setting B= S0nD and
N = S1nD, we have that wH (Bi)=wH (Ni), for i=1; : : : ; k. Moreover, one can easily
see that wH (Bj)=wH (Bi) and wH (Nj)=wH (Ni) for j 6= i. Indeed, if k is even, then, up
to a column permutation, the matrix B (resp., N ) does not change when we complement
its entries; whereas, if k is odd, then, up to a column permutation, complementing the
entries of the matrix B (resp., N ) we get as result the matrix N (resp., B). Therefore,
wH (Ni)=wH (Bi)=m=2, for i=1; : : : ; k. Setting X = f1; : : : ; kg we have that
kP
i= 1
wH (Ni)− wH (NX )=
kP
i= 1
2k−2h− 2k−1h= k2k−2h− 2k−1h=(k − 2)2k−2h
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and
wH (BX )− wH (Bj)= (2k−1 − 1)h− 2k−2h=(2k−2 − 1)h:
Let M = Swwb and let M
0= Sbbw . Consequently, for any j2X , we have that
kP
i=1
wH (Mi)− wH (MX )>(k − 2)2k−2F(m)  m
and
wH (M 0X )− wH (M 0j )>(2k−2 − 1)F(m)  m:
Hence,
kP
i=1
wH (Mi)>wH (MX ) + (k − 2)2k−2F(m)  m
>wH (M 0X ) + [(k − 2)2k−2 + 1]F(m)  m
(from Property 1 of Denition 3.1)
>wH (M 0j ) + (k − 1)2k−2F(m)  m
>wH (Mj) + (k − 1)2k−2F(m)  m+ S(m)  m:
(from Property 3 of Denition 3.1)
Thus, for any j2X , we get
kP
i=1
i 6=j
wH (Mi)>S(m)  m+ (k − 1)2k−2F(m)  m (1)
and
wH (MX )>wH (Mj) + S(m)  m+ 2k−2F(m)  m: (2)
Since m>wH (MX ), we have that
(k − 1)m>(k − 1)wH (MX )
=
kP
i=1
i 6=j
wH (MX )
>
kP
i=1
i 6=j
[wH (Mi) + S(m)  m+ 2k−2F(m)  m] (from (2))
=
kP
i=1
i 6=j
wH (Mi) + (k − 1)S(m)  m+ (k − 1)2k−2F(m)  m
>kS(m)  m+ (k − 1)2k−1F(m)  m (from (1)):
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Dividing by (k − 1)m, we get
2k−1F(m) +
k
k − 1S(m)61;
which proves the theorem.
The next corollary is an immediate consequence of previous theorem.
Corollary 4.3. In any (k; k)-threshold EVCS the pixel expansion satises m>2k−1+2.
Since F(m)  m>1 and S(m)  m>1, from Theorem 4.2, we have that
m>2k−1F(m)  m+ kk − 1S(m)  m>2
k−1 +
k
k − 1 :
Therefore, as m must be an integer, we get that m>2k−1 + 2.
In Section 5 we present a general technique to implement extended visual cryp-
tography schemes, which uses hypergraph colourings. This technique yields to (k; k)-
threshold EVCSs which, according to the previous corollary, are optimal with respect
to the pixel expansion.
If , = S = F , then
6

2k−1 +
k
k − 1
−1
:
In any (k; k)-threshold EVCS the set
AR=

(F ; S) j F>0; S>0; and 2k−1F + kk − 1S61

is referred to as the admissible region for F(m) and S(m). In the following, we
will show that for any pair of rational numbers (F ; S)2AR there exists a (k; k)-
threshold EVCS with relative dierences F and S . Let (F ; S)2AR and suppose
that (F ; S)= (d=e; f=g). Let h= eg(k−1)−2k−1dg(k−1)−kef. Since (F ; S)2AR,
then h>0. Let T be a k  h matrix whose entries are all equal to 0 and let S0 and
S1 be the basis matrices of a (k; k)-threshold VCS dened as follows: S0 is the matrix
whose columns are all the boolean k-vectors having an even number of ‘1’s, and S1
is the matrix whose columns are all the boolean k-vectors having an odd number of
‘1’s. The following protocol realizes a (k; k)-threshold EVCS. In this construction, we
describe how to encode k pixels, one for each of the input images, to obtain a pixel
of the secret image. Clearly, to encode the whole images we repeat the next protocol
on all the pixels in the images.
It is immediate to see that Sc1ckw and S
c1ck
b constructed using the Protocol in Fig. 1
are basis matrices of a (k; k)-threshold EVCS having relative dierences F =d=e and
S =f=g. Indeed, let X = f1; : : : ; kg, for any c1; : : : ; ck 2fw; bg, for any M 2Cc1ckb ,
154 G. Ateniese et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 250 (2001) 143{161
Input:
1. The basis matrices S0 and S1.
2. The k  h matrix T .
3. The colours c1; : : : ; ck 2fb; wg of the pixels in the original k images.
4. The colour c2fb; wg of the pixel of the secret image the dealer wants
to share.
Generation of the k shares:
1. Construct a k  k matrix D as follows:
For i=1 to k do
if ci= b then set all entries of row i of D to 1.
else set entry (i; i) of D to 1 and set all remaining entries
of row i to 0.
2. The collection Cc1ckc is constructed by considering the matrices
obtained by permuting, in all possible ways, the columns of the matrix
Sc1ckc =
8>><
>>:
S0      S0| {z }
(k−1)dg
D      D| {z }
ef
T if c=w
S1      S1| {z }
(k−1)dg
D      D| {z }
ef
T if c= b:
3. Let M be a matrix randomly chosen in Cc1ckc .
Output: The matrix M .
Fig. 1. The protocol for a (k; k)-threshold EVCS.
and for any M 0 2Cc1ckw it holds that
wH (MX )= 2k−1(k − 1)dg+ kef
and
wH (M 0X )= (2
k−1 − 1)(k−1)dg+ kef =wH (MX )− (k−1)dg=wH (MX )− F  m:
Hence, setting tX =wH (MX ), we have that Property 1 of Denition 3.1 is satised.
Clearly, Property 2 of Denition 3.1 holds. Property 3 is satised, too. Indeed, it is
easy to see that for any c1; : : : ; ck 2fw; bg, for any i2X , for any M 2Cc1ci−1bci+1ckci ,
and for any M 0 2Cc1ci−1wci+1ckci , it holds that
wH (Mi)− wH (M 0i )= ef(k − 1)= S  m:
5. A general construction for extended VCS
Our general construction uses hypergraph colourings. We begin with some relevant
denitions. A hypergraph is a pair of the form (X;B), where B 2X . (In other words,
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Input:
1. An access structure ( Qual;  Forb) on a set P of n participants.
2. The basis matrices S0 and S1 of a ( Qual;  Forb; m)-VCS.
3. The colours c1; : : : ; cn 2fb; wg of the pixels in the original n images.
4. The colour c2fb; wg of the pixel of the secret image the dealer wants
to share.
5. A q-colouring  of the hypergraph (P;  0).
Generation of the n shares:
1. Construct an n q matrix D as follows:
For i=1 to n do
if ci= b then set all entries of row i of D to 1.
else set entry (i; (i)) of D to 0 and set all remaining
entries of row i to 1.
2. The collection Cc1cnc is constructed by considering the matrices
obtained by permuting, in all possible ways, the columns of the matrix
Sc1cnc =

S0  D if c=w
S1  D if c= b:
3. Let M be a matrix randomly chosen in Cc1cnc .
Output: The matrix M .
Fig. 2. The protocol to generate the shares for EVCSs.
a hypergraph is a set of subsets of a given set.) Members of X are called vertices and
members of B are called edges. (In the case where every edge has cardinality two, a
hypergraph is in fact a graph.)
A q-colouring of a hypergraph H =(X;B) is a function  :X !f1; : : : ; qg such that
jf(x): x2Bgj>2
for all B2B such that jBj>2. (In other words, every edge having at least two vertices
contains at least two vertices receiving dierent colours.) The chromatic number of
H , denoted (H), is the minimum integer q such that a q-colouring of H exists.
We will have more to say about chromatic numbers of hypergraphs later on, but for
now we observe that (H)6jX j for any hypergraph H =(X;B). This is easily seen by
assigning a dierent colour to every vertex. (This colouring will be called the trivial
colouring.)
Our general construction for extended VCS, which we present in Fig. 2, uses an
arbitrary q-colouring  of the hypergraph (P;  0). In this construction, we describe
how to encode n pixels, one for each of the input images, to obtain a pixel of the
secret image. Clearly, to encode the whole images we repeat the protocol of Fig. 2 on
all the pixels in the images.
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In the previous protocol the collections Cc1cnc are obtained by permuting, in all
possible ways, the columns of the matrix Sc1cnc . Because of Lemma 4.1 we do not
need to permute the columns of the matrix D in step 2. Even though we use more
random bits, we prefer to permute all the columns to achieve more uniform distribution
of the sub-pixels.
The construction presented in Example 3.2 used the trivial 2-colouring of the hyper-
graph (f1; 2g; ff1; 2gg) and it is based on a 2 out of 2 threshold VCS described by
the following basis matrices:
S0 =

1 0
1 0

and S1 =

1 0
0 1

:
The matrix D we concatenated to S0 and S1 to obtain the collections Cc1c2c , where
c; c1; c2 2fb; wg, is constructed as follows:
D=
8>>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>>:

0 1
1 0

if c1 = c2 =w;
0 1
1 1

if c1 =w and c2 = b;
1 1
1 0

if c1 = b and c2 =w;
1 1
1 1

if c1 = c2 = b:
Here is another small example to illustrate the construction.
Example 5.1. Let P= f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g and let  Qual= cl( 0), where  0 = ff1; 2; 3; 4g;
f1; 5gg. Assume that  Forb=2Pn Qual. A visual cryptography scheme for ( Qual;  Forb)
can be obtained using the following basis matrices:
S0 =
2
66664
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
3
77775 ; S1 =
2
66664
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
3
77775 :
Let H =(P;  0). Now it is not hard to see that (H)= 2. For example, if we dene
(1)= 1 and (2)=(3)=(4)=(5)= 2, then  is a 2-colouring.
Therefore, the collections Cwbwwww and C
wbwww
b are obtained by permuting the columns
of the following basis matrices Swbwwww and S
wbwww
b , respectively:
Swbwwww =
2
66664
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
3
77775 ;
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Swbwwwb =
2
66664
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
3
77775 :
Let us now show that the construction given in Fig. 1 actually produces an extended
VCS. First we observe that, by Lemma 4.1, it results that any pair of collections
(Cc1cnw ;C
c1cn
b ) constitutes a VCS for ( Qual;  Forb). This implies that the extended
visual cryptography scheme so obtained is secure as, for any c1; : : : ; cn 2fb; wg and
for any X = fi1; : : : ; ijX jg2 Forb, it results that Sc1cnw [X ] = Sc1cnb [X ] (i.e., for any
c1; : : : ; cn 2fb; wg the two collections of the jX j(m+q) matrices obtained by restricting
each n(m+q) matrix in Cc1cnw and Cc1cnb to rows i1; i2; : : : ; ijX j are indistinguishable
in the sense that they contain the same matrices with the same frequencies).
Next, we claim that for any c1; : : : ; cn 2fb; wg and for any X 2 Qual the or of the
rows of the matrix D corresponding to participants in X has weight wH (DX )= q.
Suppose that this is not the case. Then some component of DX is zero, say the jth
component. It follows that (i1)=    =(ijX j)= j, which contradicts the fact that 
is a q-colouring of the hypergraph (P;  0).
This implies that for any c1; : : : ; cn 2fb; wg, for any M 2Cc1cnw , and any M^ 2Cc1cnb
it results that wH (M^X )>tX + q and
wH (MX )6tX + q− 0(m+ q)  (m+ q);
where
0(m+ q)= (m)  m=(m+ q);
tX is the threshold of the scheme for ( Qual;  Forb) we start with, and (m) is the
relative dierence satisfying Denition 2.2 for the access structures ( Qual;  Forb) when
we use the VCS based on the basis matrices S0 and S1. Therefore, when transparencies
associated to participants in a set X 2 Qual are stacked together the secret image will
be visible.
Finally, notice that even though the n original images are modied they are still
meaningful as, for i=1; : : : ; n, a white pixel in the image of the ith participant is
encoded into m + q sub-pixels of which wH (S0i ) + q − 1 are black; whereas, a black
pixel in the image of the ith participants is encoded into m + q sub-pixels of which
wH (S1i )+q=wH (S
0
i )+q are black. This implies that S(m)= 1=m. Therefore, participant
i is still able to distinguish the image on his transparency.
The next theorem holds.
Theorem 5.2. Let ( Qual;  Forb) be an access structure on a set P of n participants. If
there exists a ( Qual;  Forb; m)-VCS constructed using basis matrices and a q-colouring
of the hypergraph (P;  0); then there exists a ( Qual;  Forb; m+ q)-EVCS.
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6. Applications
In the construction of Fig. 1, we would like to minimize q, i.e., by taking q= (H)
where H =(P;  0). In general, however, it is an NP-hard problem to compute the chro-
matic number of a hypergraph. In particular, determining if a hypergraph has chromatic
number equal to two is already an NP-complete problem. Even if we restrict our at-
tention to graphs, the situation is not much better, as it is NP-complete to determine
if a graph has chromatic number equal to three. It is NP-hard even to compute an
approximation of the chromatic number of a graph. In fact, recently in [10] it has
been proved that for some >0 it is NP-hard to approximate the chromatic number
of graphs with n vertices by a factor of n. Moreover, is has been shown that for
every >0 the chromatic number cannot be approximated by a factor of n1=5− unless
NP=ZPP. Other results on the hardness of approximating the chromatic number can
be found in [7].
However, we can make use of some known results to get upper bounds and=or exact
values of  for some interesting classes of access structures. As well, for \small" access
structures it is not too dicult to compute the chromatic number.
As far as general bounds are concerned, there is an upper bound on  which depends
on a suitable denition of \maximum degree" of a hypergraph. Suppose H =(X;B) is
a hypergraph. For a vertex x2X , dene the degree of x to be
d(x)= maxfjAj: AB; E \F = fxg for all E; F 2A; E 6=Fg:
(Note that if H is a graph then the denition of d(x) reduces to the usual graph-
theoretic denition of the degree of x.) Then dene dmax(H)= maxfd(x): x2X g.
Notice that for any hypergraph H =(P;  0) we have that dmax(H)6j 0j.
The following result can be found in [8, p. 431], for example.
Theorem 6.1. Suppose H is a hypergraph. Then (H)6dmax(H) + 1.
Note that this result reduces to the well-known Vizing’s Theorem when H is a graph.
6.1. Threshold schemes
One case of interest is a threshold access structure. Let ( Qual;  Forb) be the ac-
cess structure of a k out of n threshold scheme. The basis consists of all k-subsets
of an n-set. This hypergraph is called the complete uniform hypergraph Kkn . It is
not hard to see that the chromatic number is (Kkn )= dn=(k − 1)e. In fact, a function
 : f1; : : : ; ng!f1; : : : ; qg will be a q-colouring of Kkn if and only if j−1(j)j6k − 1
for 16j6q.
Hence, the next theorem holds.
Theorem 6.2. Let ( Qual;  Forb) be a (k; n)-threshold access structure. If there exists a
( Qual;  Forb; m)-VCS constructed using basis matrices then there exists a ( Qual;  Forb;
m+ dn=(k − 1)e)-EVCS.
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Results on VCS for threshold access structures can be found in [1, 13]. The next
corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 6.2 and [13, Lemma 3].
Corollary 6.3. Let ( Qual;  Forb) be an (n; n)-threshold access structure. Then there
exists a ( Qual;  Forb; 2n−1 + 2)-EVCS.
According to Corollary 4.3 it results that the scheme provided by the previous corol-
lary is optimal with respect to the pixel expansion.
6.2. Complete bipartite graphs
Suppose that the basis  0 is a complete bipartite graph Ka;b. It is obvious that
the chromatic number of any bipartite graph is equal to two. Also, it was shown in
[1, Theorem 7.5] that there is a ( Qual;  Forb; 2)-VCS if ( Qual;  Forb) is the strong
access structure with basis Ka;b. Applying Theorem 5.2, the following result is obtained.
Theorem 6.4. Suppose that ( Qual;  Forb) is the strong access structure with basis
Ka;b. Then there exists a ( Qual;  Forb; 4)-EVCS.
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Appendix A. An example of extended visual cryptography schemes
In the following an example of the secret image, the shares corresponding to sin-
gle participants, and few groups of participants are depicted. The family of qualied
sets is
 Qual= ff1; 2g; f2; 3g; f1; 2; 3gg:
All remaining subsets of participants are forbidden. In this scheme we have that
S(m)= F(m)= 14 (Figs. 3{7).
Fig. 3.
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